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WESLEY AS THEOLOGICAL MENTOR:
The Question of Truth or Salvation through Other Religions*
Randy L. Maddox
In Memorium: Dr. Joseph Mayfield1
In her 1974 presidential address to this society Mildred Bangs
Wynkoop called upon Wesley scholars to develop a truly hermeneutical
approach. She argued that the all-too-common practice of using Wesley merely
as a scholastic authority (which she termed “Wesley as guru”) should be
transformed into an approach that draws upon an historically-sensitive reading
of Wesley to deal with contemporary issues (a model that she termed “Wesley
as mentor”).2 A few years later Albert Outler issued much the same plea in his
address to the 1982 Oxford Institute of Methodist Theological Studies. He
suggested as a slogan for contemporary Wesleyan theologians: “Back to
Wesley and his sources, and then forward—with his sense of heritage and
openness to the future as one of our models.”3
My interest in and study of Wesley’s theology owes much to these two
forebearers, and I have tried to follow their methodological advice in my own
explorations of a contemporary Wesleyan theology. To the degree that I have
been successful, I have found it to be a very fruitful approach. In hopes of
illustrating this fruitfulness, I have chosen to devote this study to a correlation
of Wesley and a contemporary issue.
The issue that I have selected to consider concerns the implications of
the Christian confession of Jesus as Lord and Savior for understand-
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8ing the status of other world religions. Does this confession exclude the
possibility of any truth in other religions? Does it restrict final salvation to
Christians alone? What are its implications for the motives and methods of
cross-cultural evangelization? Anyone familiar with contemporary Christian
theology knows that questions such as these are prominent in the discussion.
That is one of my reasons for choosing this topic. The other major reason is
that I believe that Wesley offers a distinctive contribution to this discussion,
particularly to those in the Evangelical arena who typically claim him as one of
their own.4
I. CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN DEBATE CONCERNING OTHER
RELIGIONS
It is a severe understatement to say that there is a lack of consensus in
current discussion of Christianity’s relation to other religions. In an influential
recent survey Paul Knitter distinguished four major contrasting positions.5 At
one end of his spectrum is the Conservative Evangelical Model which defends
the exclusive normative status of Christianity against all challenges. A slight
modification of this is the Mainline Protestant Model which allows for some
revelation of God in other religions but restricts its effect such that salvation is
only possible in Christianity. Still further along the spectrum is the Catholic
Model, drawing on post-Vatican II theology, which allows that God may work
salvifically through other religions, but always in conformity with the norm of
Christ’s revelation. Finally, Knitter identifies (and argues for) a Theocentric
Model, which limits the normativeness of Christ to the Christian
religion—assuming that other religions constitute authentic independent
avenues of salvation.
The Theocentric Model of Christianity’s relation to other religions has
found support beyond Knitter, most notably in the writings of John Hick.6 At
the same time, its radical relativism has troubled many in main-stream
Christianity, sparking sophisticated attempts to reaffirm Christ’s universal
normativeness without denying that truth might be found in other religions.7
The negative response to the proposals of Hick and Knitter has been even
greater among Evangelical missiologists and theologians.8 Significantly, the
issue that has emerged as central in this Evangelical discussion is the fate of
those who are never exposed to the Christian message.9 It would appear that
this specific issue pierces to the most fundamental convictions of one’s
understanding of God (a point I will return to in discussing Wesley).
We in the Wesleyan traditions, of all people, must surely recognize that
several considerations come into play when deciding issues like those 
9involved in the current debate over the relationship of Christianity to other
religions. For example, there should be 1) exegetical consideration of the
relevant portions of Scripture; 2) phenomenological consideration of the
claimed similarities, differences, and benefits that humans experience in the
various world religions; and, 3) rigorous philosophical analysis of the clarity
and cogency of the arguments presented (i.e., the contribution of reason). Such
considerations are amply represented in recent publications on our topic. By
contrast, there is another level of consideration that has received less attention
than it warrants—that of tradition. What lessons about the possible positions
on our topic, and the implications of these positions, can we glean from the
wisdom of previous Christian reflection and life? That is the question which I
want to put to Wesley.
The very notion of turning to an eighteenth-century figure with this
question might seem senseless. If one judged by the standard selections of
readings on Christianity and other religions, little of interest or help was
written on our topic prior to the twentieth century!10 However, while it must be
admitted that previous centuries of Christian theology did not possess as
detailed or sympathetic a knowledge of the breadth of world religions as ours,
this does not mean that the relevant issues were not dealt with in more limited
contexts. More importantly, it does not mean that there was a uniform attitude
to these issues through the prior history of the Church.
Indeed, the initial broader historical work that has been done suggests
that Christian interaction with and evaluation of other religions has gone
through three major phases.11 During the first three centuries of Christian
history there was significant interchange with Greco-Roman mythology and
philosophy, including some positive readings (particularly by Greek
theologians) of certain philosophers as defenders of the Divine truth
definitively revealed in Christ.12 Scattered examples of such positive
interaction carry over into the seventh century, until—with the emergence and
military spread of Islam—they are largely supplanted by conflict and
controversy. Commercial and other contacts with the Islamic world and points
further East began to increase significantly again in the sixteenth century. The
exposure to other religions gained through these contacts helped to rekindle a
diversity in theological evaluations of the availability of some knowledge of
God apart from the definitive revelation of Christ.
This brief historical summary provides initial warrant for suggesting
that Wesley might have something to offer us concerning the issue of 
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Christianity’s relation to other religions. On the one hand, he had a particular
fondness for many of the early Greek theologians who had championed a more
positive evaluation of “pagan” wisdom.13 On the other hand, he was an early
beneficiary of the increasing interest in other religions. To develop this latter
point, it might be helpful to delineate Wesley’s actual knowledge of and
attitudes toward other religions, within his historical context.
II. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH KNOWLEDGE OF AND
ATTITUDES TO OTHER RELIGIONS
Our consideration of Wesley in this regard is benefited greatly by
David Pailin’s recent survey of attitudes to other religions in seventeenth-and
eighteenth-century England.14 Pailin traces the growing awareness and
comparative treatment of religions in England beginning with Herbert of
Cherbury’s De Religione Gentilium (1645). He shows that most eighteenth-
century treatments had little reliable information to work with on any other
religions than Islam, ancient Judaism, and (to a lesser extent) contemporary
Judaism. As a result, most comparative studies identified only four major
religions: Christianity, Judaism, Mohametanism (Islam), and Paganism.
This four-fold classification was specifically characteristic of those
discussions of other religions with which Wesley was demonstrably
familiar—writings by Isaac Barrow, Richard Baxter, and Edward Brerewood.15
As such, it is not surprising that Wesley also tended to organize religions in
these categories.16
For example, Judaism was always included in surveys that Wesley
made of human religions. I hasten to add, however, that Wesley (like his
contemporaries) demonstrated limited interest in, or knowledge of,
contemporary Judaism. Instead, most of his uses of the category “Jew” were
historical or theological in intent—designating either a preliminary
dispensation of God’s grace and revelation that Christ brought to completion,
or a person who obeys God out of fear rather than out of love.17 When Wesley
did describe contemporary Judaism, he tended to echo the negative evaluations
that Pailin has shown were common in his time.18 And yet, at least in his later
years, he refused to condemn Jews summarily, arguing that Christians should
leave their fate in the hands of God.19
In general, Islam received more focused (and, if possible, more
distorted and hostile) treatment than Judaism in Christian evaluations from the
thirteenth century on.20 Two factors account for much of  this situa-
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tion: the military clashes between the two faiths, and the ironic apologetic
method which transformed many of the arguments used to defend the
superiority of Christianity over Judaism into comparisons of Islam versus
Christianity! The reactionary evaluations of Islam continued into Wesley’s
immediate context.21 As such, it is hardly surprising that he would include a
recital of the “barbarities” of Islamic practices and the “absurdities” of the
Quran in his collation of empirical evidence for the reality of human
depravity.22 Nor is it unexpected that he would react so negatively to the
attempt of Henri de Boulainvillier to present Islam to the West as a desirable
alternative to “Papism” and Christianity in general.23 Just how negative (and
misinformed) Wesley’s general impression of Islam was is best seen in his
judgement that “Mohametans” hardly differ from “heathens” in their lack of
revelation, religious sensitivity, and moral concern.24 Precisely because of this
negative evaluation, however, it is striking that Wesley’s late sermons should
1) forbid a summary damnation of Muslims, 2) praise the sincerity of their
response to the limited revelation they have received (in explicit contrast to the
English Deists!), and 3) argue that we have great reason to hope that some
Muslims have indeed come into experience of true religion through their
sensitivity to God’s inward voice.25 For Wesley, of course, such “true religion”
would qualify one for eternal salvation!
Wesley’s final category of religions were the “heathens” or “pagans.”
This was an inclusive category for all who lacked exposure to God’s unique
revelation offered to Israel and in Christ. We have already noted that Wesley at
times placed Islam in this category. He consistently included three other
identifiable groups among the heathen. The first of these groups is the Greco-
Roman philosophical and religious traditions with which early Christianity
interacted. Wesley’s comments on this group reflect the tension of the early
Church: on the one hand he praised signs of true piety and virtue among some
philosophers; on the other hand he stressed even their limitations and
denounced much of the popular mythology and religious practice.26
A second identifiable group of heathen in Wesley’s considerations
were the tribal religions of Africa and North America. Most of his comments
on this group focus on Native Americans because he had some direct
experience with them. In his university years Wesley picked up a romantic
conception of the “noble savage” as possessing a moral and religious clarity
free from the distorting sophistications and ambitions of advanced culture. His
actual encounters with Native Americans soon dis-
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abused him of this fanciful image.27 His immediate reaction was quite
strong—he reclassified their religion as demonic!28 Over time a nuanced
tension emerged in his comments on such primal religions: when responding to
romantic or deistic commendations of natural religion he critiqued the
supposed religious and moral purity of native groups;29 but when he turned his
attention to the supposed moral superiority of English culture, he often used
comparisons with the morality and humanity of native cultures to conclude that
it would be preferable to “convert the English into honest heathens.”30 His
most biting comments come when he criticized supposed “Christians”
specifically for how they had mistreated and enslaved these native peoples.31
A third possible group of heathens were the more developed religions
of India and China. There was very little information about Buddhism
available in Britain before the nineteenth century.32 Likewise, the few accounts
of China that were available to Wesley dealt only in broad strokes with
Chinese culture and were not very reliable even on these topics, as he
realized.33 By contrast, there were relatively more treatments of Hinduism
published in Britain in the latter half of the eighteenth century.34 However,
these publications also tended to be unreliable, mixing elements of Buddhism
and Zoroastrianism indiscriminately with Hindu teaching. Wesley’s reflections
on the one such publication which we have any evidence that he read
illustrates well such confusions.35 More revealing are his reflections on an
account of British colonial impact on India. Here again his sympathies came to
lie with the native population, as he became convinced that it was the so-called
Christians who were really acting like heathens!36
Whatever their variety, the final point that I would make about the
heathens is that the late Wesley again held out a significant hope that many of
them might have found a true saving relationship with God by responding to
the light that they had received!37
III. WESLEY ON TRUTH AND SALVATION THROUGH OTHER
RELIGIONS
On reflection, the point that emerges most dramatically from the
preceding survey of Wesley’s comments on other religions is not the obvious
limitations and distortions of his knowledge. It is the element of positive
evaluation that is evident, especially in his later thought.
This element is particularly striking when viewed against his context.
Having surveyed the attitudes to other religions in Wesley’s setting David 
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Pailin concluded that there were five major motivations for invoking
consideration of other religions in theological debates of the time: 1) as a
further means of attacking other Christian groups—by showing resemblances
to heathens; 2) to distinguish Christian evidences of its truth claims from that
of other religions (particularly Islam); 3) to show that there were no credible
rivals to Christianity among world religions; 4) to enhance the readers’
appreciation of the merits of Christianity and promote their devotion to it; and
5) to gather evidence for or against currently debated notions, particularly that
of “general revelation.”38 One can find traces of each of these agendas in
Wesley’s various comments on other religions. However, his dominant
concern appears to focus increasingly on the latter issue of the reality and
implications of a generally-available revelation of God.39 If we are to gain a
more systematic understanding of his view of other religions, we would do
well to start with this topic.
A. The Gracious Character of All Revelation
There has been an ongoing debate in Wesley scholarship over whether
Wesley believed that human beings could have knowledge of God apart from
God’s definitive revelation in Jesus Christ. I believe that this debate results
more from an inappropriate framing of the question than from ambiguities in
Wesley. The debate has typically been framed in terms of whether Wesley
affirmed a “natural revelation” or a “natural theology.”40 Behind such
designations is the assumption that any universal knowledge of God available
through consideration of the world and human life would necessarily be
“natural” knowledge rather than “gracious” knowledge.
It is not surprising that the question is frequently framed this way,
because the polarization of “nature” and “grace” increasingly characterized
Western theology, becoming definitive of much of Protestantism.41 Thus, when
Wesley is read in a Protestant paradigm (as is most common), he is forced
toward one or the other of opposing alternatives: either he is assumed to affirm
that humans can have some knowledge of God apart from grace, or he is read
to deny the existence of any significant knowledge outside of definitive
Christian revelation.
By contrast with later Western theology, many early Greek theologians
avoided such polarization. They made no absolute separation between
“general” and “Christian” revelation. They saw both as based in God’s grace,
with God’s revelation in Christ establishing and completing the divine
revelation in creation.42
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Wesley’s mature convictions about revelation appear to be more in line
with such early Greek perspectives than with later Western theology. He too
came to affirm that there is a basic knowledge of God universally available to
those who have not heard of Christ, while insisting that this knowledge was
itself an expression of God’s gracious activity epitomized in the revelation of
Christ.43
To be sure, Wesley achieved this result in a different manner than was
typical of early Greek theologians. They usually assumed that there was a
continuing (weakened) influence of the grace of creation even after the Fall.
Through his distinctive wedding of total depravity with universal Prevenient
Grace, Wesley grounded the knowledge of God available to those who have
not heard of Christ in an initial expression of the grace of restoration.44
In other words, Wesley was convinced that no one had access to God
apart from the gracious restoration of divine self-revelation. However, he also
believed that this revelation was available in a continuum of progressively
more definitive expressions, beginning with a basic knowledge that was
universally available and reaching definitive expression in Christ.45
B. Initial Universal Revelation 
In keeping with his empiricist epistemological commitments, Wesley
denied that humans have an innate idea of God stamped on our souls. All
knowledge of God must come either through inference from God’s works or
by direct sensation through our “spiritual senses.”46 For initial universally-
available knowledge about God, the major source that Wesley consistently
identified was inference from God’s creation.47 Beyond this constant, his
precise convictions about the content and effectiveness of God’s universal
beginning self-revelation fluctuated somewhat through time. This fluctuation
was not arbitrary, but illustrates a pattern many scholars view as characteristic
of a broader integrative development in Wesley’s theological convictions, a
pattern distinguished into three main periods: the “early Wesley” (1733–38),
the “middle Wesley” (1738–65), and the “late Wesley” (1765–91).48
As I noted previously, the early Wesley romanticized the situation of
native peoples. He assumed that they were innocent, humble, willing to learn,
and eager to do the will of God. He even claimed that one of his main reasons
for undertaking the mission to Georgia was to present his understanding of the
gospel to the Native Americans, for they would immediately discern if his
doctrines were authentic or not!49 We also saw 
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that his actual encounters with Native Americans failed to live up to such
unrealistic expectations, leading to an initial reaction of characterizing all
religion of those who have no revelation of Christ as demonic.
Wesley’s disillusionment in Georgia coincided with his heightened
appreciation for the Protestant emphasis on distinctively Christian grace. As a
result, the period shortly following 1738 evidenced his most negative
evaluations of initial universal revelation. He did not deny it, but he saw it as
nearly empty. Consideration of God’s creation might convince us of God’s
existence, but it could tell us nothing of God’s nature.50
As time passed, Wesley’s estimation of the contribution of universal
revelation appears to have increased. In 1748 we find him suggesting that
God’s basic attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, and wisdom can be
deduced from creation.51 By 1754 he included at least a vague awareness of the
general lines of good and evil in the knowledge universally available.52
This is not to say that Wesley now considered this initial universal
revelation to be self-sufficient. Indeed, in 1757 he wrote a lengthy polemic
against Bishop John Taylor’s “deistic” claim that heathens have sufficient
knowledge and power to know God and obey God’s will. Given the situational
nature of this piece, it is not surprising that it one-sidedly emphasized the
limitations of universal revelation. However, even here Wesley did not deny
that some knowledge was available to all, only that it was effective in
producing virtuous (i.e., holy) lives.53
By the 1780s Wesley had nuanced even this assumption. He now
claimed that initial universal revelation enabled people to infer not only that
there was a powerful, wise, just, and merciful Creator, but also that there
would be a future state of punishment or reward for present actions. More
importantly, he suggested that God may have taught some heathens all the
essentials of true religion (i.e., holiness) by an “inward voice.”54 That is, he
raised the possibility that Prevenient Grace might involve more than simply
strengthening our human faculties and testifying to us through creation. It
might also provide actual overtures to our “spiritual senses”!55 With provisions
such as this, some people would surely pursue virtuous lives, and the late
Wesley appeared willing to acknowledge some attainment. However, he was
quick to add that such cases would be less pure and far less common than in
the Christian dispensation. Moreover, he was convinced that these persons
would not have the assurance that is available to Christians through the
Spirit.56
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C. The Uniqueness of Definitive Christian Revelation
Wesley’s acknowledgement of, and understanding of, the initial
universal revelation of God would have been largely acceptable to the
emerging deistic temper of his day. That is, until he raised the suggestion of
direct spiritual sensation! Here lies the crucial parting of the roads between
Wesley and Deism (in both its rationalist and empiricist forms). They limited
all credible revelation to that either grounded in or conformable with general
human knowledge. Wesley, by contrast, assumed that the most definitive and
important knowledge of God was not universally available, nor derived by
mere inference. It must be obtained directly from God.57
Obviously, Wesley believed that this definitive revelation of God took
place in Christ and is found in Scripture. What might not be so obvious are the
major distinctive elements of the Christian worldview which he assumed could
be known only through this revelation. He ultimately reduced these to two: the
free forgiveness of God evident in Christ and the renewing power of God
present in the Holy Spirit.58 On reflection, these two are inherently interrelated.
One of Wesley’s most fundamental convictions was that authentic Christian
life flows out of love, and that genuine human love can only exist in response
to an awareness of God’s pardoning love to us. It is in Christ’s atoning work
that the Divine pardoning love is clearly assured to humanity and it is through
the witness of the Spirit that this love is “shed abroad in our hearts,”
empowering our loving response.59 Herein lies the rationale for Wesley’s
assumption, noted earlier, that Christians have available a greater potential for
recovering holiness of life than do those with only initial revelation.
D. The Possibility of Extra-Christian Salvation?
This brings us, of course, to the perennial Christian perplexity about
how God will deal with those who are never exposed to definitive Christian
revelation. It must be noted at the outset that Wesley rejected one possible
solution to this problem that has had advocates through the history of the
Church—namely, the claim that God might provide another chance after death
for those who do not receive the full revelation in this life, so that they might
be made aware of it and respond (positively or negatively). He specifically
rejected the Roman Catholic notion of limbo for patriarchs.60 He even opposed
the idea that Christ descended into Hell between his death and resurrection!61
In both cases his primary concern seems to have been avoiding any weakening
of the importance of responding to the gospel in this life.62
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Then how does Wesley believe that God will deal with the unevan-
gelized? Will they be “saved”? Given his understanding of salvation as
recovered holiness (not merely forgiveness), this issue had two dimensions for
Wesley. At its most abstract level, it was simply the question whether those
who lack definitive Christian revelation will be summarily excluded from
eternal blessing. At a more concrete level, it was the question whether such
persons can (or must) develop at least a degree of holiness in this life, which
Wesley considered to be the Christian foretaste and condition of final
salvation.
Wesley’s answer to the first question is fairly clear and apparently
consistent throughout his life. His conviction of the unfailing justice and
universal love of God made it impossible for him to believe that people who
lacked knowledge of Christ through no fault of their own (i.e., invincible
ignorance) would be automatically excluded from heaven.63 Accordingly, he
repeatedly prefaced claims about the qualifications for eternal salvation with
an exemption from consideration of those who received only initial revelation.
He argued that Scripture gave no authority for anyone to make definitive
claims about them. Their fate must be left to the mercy of God, who is the God
of heathens as well as of Christians.64 This conviction took its most formal
expression when he deleted the Anglican Article XVIII (“Of Obtaining Eternal
Salvation Only by the Name of Christ”) from the Articles of Religion that he
sent to the American Methodists.65
At times, Wesley ventured beyond this mere refusal to condemn those
who had available only initial universal revelation. When he did so, the second
dimension of the issue—the connection of present salvation (holiness, in some
degree) to future salvation—came into play. Given his assumption that God’s
self-revelation in Christ and the Spirit empowered humans to recover a level of
holiness unattainable through initial revelation, Wesley’s unique dilemma was
why God allowed some to be born in areas where the development of requisite
holiness was not possible (he rejected the suggestion that it was punishment
for pre-existent disobedience).66 This situation struck at the heart of Wesley’s
theological concern, because a God of truly “responsible grace” could neither
summarily condemn such people for lacking holiness nor indiscriminately
affirm them all (i.e., universalism), thereby denying them the freedom to refuse
divine grace.67
The late Wesley (with his more positive estimate of initial revelation)
turned to another solution for this problem that had recommended 
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itself to many Christians before him: God will judge the heathens with some
discrimination after all; not directly in terms of their appropriation or rejection
of Christ, but in terms of how they respond to the gracious revelation (light)
that they do receive.68 This assumes, of course, that some degree of true
spirituality or holiness can emerge in response to God’s gracious initial
revelation—a possibility that the late Wesley was willing to admit.69 To be
sure, this holiness may fall short of Christian standards for final salvation, but
the lack would be supplied by divine indulgence.70
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have covered a wide and varying terrain in this study. What general
conclusions might we draw to round it off?
A first conclusion is fairly simple and should have been sufficiently
demonstrated by now: there is a stronger suggestion than has usually been
recognized in Wesley’s mature thought that some of those who have never
heard of Christ may experience a degree of God’s present saving power and
enter into God’s eternal saving Presence.71
Of course while such salvation would be apart from explicit
acquaintance with Christ, Wesley would always maintain that it too was
through Christ, since any human response to God was possible only because of
the universal Prevenient Grace of God, which is rooted in the atoning work of
Christ.72 Likewise, Wesley was certainly not advocating universal salvation;
like all Divine grace, Prevenient Grace is “responsible,” empowering but not
overriding human accountability.73
It is also important to note that Wesley would not see this possibility of
salvation among the heathen as in any way lessening the urgency of their
evangelization, much less suggesting that they are better left without the added
“responsibility” for definitive Christian revelation.74 For Wesley the good
news of God’s pardoning love manifest in Christ does not add extra content to
the task of obedience, it brings a renewing power for the life of obedience.
One thing that remains unclear is how Wesley would respond to
persons of other religious faiths who are presented with the message of Christ
and opt to remain in their original community. The most likely community
with which he would have experienced this firsthand was Judaism, and he
showed some ambivalence between condemning their “hardness of heart” and
arguing that we should leave them in God’s hands. One gets the sense that he
cannot imagine the message of 
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Christ being placed aside, if it has been presented truly—e.g., not drowned out
by the contradictory lives of the Christian community that bears the message.
From what we have seen about Wesley’s estimation of the situation of
the heathen one might also draw some conclusions about appropriate means of
evangelization. In particular, Mark Royster seems correct in his claim that
Wesley’s doctrine of Prevenient Grace supports a positive valuation of the
agenda of inculturating or contextualizing the Gospel in evangelism and
missions.75 If God is already graciously at work in a beginning sense in one’s
existing cultural setting, then conversion to Christianity need not require a
comprehensive rejection of this culture. Rather, one would begin the
demanding perennial task of cultural discernment, in light of the definitive
revelation of Christ.
The final conclusion that I would note is the most general, and the one
that I find most relevant for the current Christian debate over the nature and
status of other religions. Particularly in Evangelical circles suggestions of
some truth existing in other religions, or of some possibility of salvation
among those who have never heard of Christ, are typically charged with a lack
of appreciation for the indispensable role of divine grace in salvation.76 But
this cannot be said of Wesley. He quite clearly grounds all salvation in God’s
grace. If he differs from other theologians who would rule out any possibility
of salvation among the heathen, it is not in the need for grace, but in the nature
of God’s grace.77 In other words, the convictions that lead Wesley to suggest
that a truly loving and just God would judge the heathen in terms of their
response to the light of initial universal revelation are the same convictions
that had led him earlier to reject unconditional predestination.78
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